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1. Introduction 
The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts 
refer to what they do (or, for those who prefer not to use 'refer' when speaking about 
thoughts, in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about). 
This can seem like an odd question, because it seems so obvious that first-person 
thoughts are about the person thinking them. Being about the thinker of the thought 
seems to be part of what it is to be a first-person thought.  But its being obvious 
that first-person thought is always about the person thinking it does not make it 
obvious in virtue of what this is the case. (Any more than its being obvious that 
some uses of "Aristotle" refer to a certain philosopher makes it obvious in virtue of 
what this is the case.) Let us call the question of in virtue of what a first-person 
thought refers to what it refers to (or is about what it is about) the Question of 
First-Person Aboutness. My focus here will be on a dilemma arising from this 
question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be 
satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the aforementioned truism that 
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first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other 
hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to 
the Question of First-Person Aboutness unsatisfying. 
Contrary to a careful and enticing recent effort to both sharpen and escape this 
dilemma by Daniel Morgan,2 I will argue that the dilemma resists this effort. At 
present, I do not see a good way of escaping it. I find this troubling in part because I 
am drawn to a general view of what it is for things (at any rate, concrete things, 
human beings included) to be genuinely thought about, or "in" our thoughts. This 
view holds that one requirement is that the thinker has a perception-based form of 
acquaintance with the things thought about. This view in turn requires an answer to 
the Question of First-Person Aboutness that seems certain to be speared on the first 
horn of the dilemma. The type of answer required by the acquaintance view of 
reference determination is different from the type of answer that Morgan defends 
against the dilemma. But they face similar challenges stemming from the idea that 
first-person thought is guaranteed to be about the person thinking it. Moreover, it is 
not clear that either of them can overcome these challenges. My goal here is to show 
the power of the dilemma by homing in on the types of cases that make the horn of 
violating the guarantee of reflexive reference the sharpest. It is hard to see how a 
satisfying answer to the Question of First-Person Aboutness can avoid this problem. 
But giving up on the search for a satisfying answer is also unappealing. I conclude 
that the dilemma remains, with the acquaintance view of reference-determination as 
one of its hostages. 
The plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2, I will set out the general 
acquaintance-based view of what it is for things to be in thought that I favor, and 
that I take to be threatened by the case of first-person thought. In section 3, I will 
explain how first-person thought threatens this view, as well as broadly epistemic 
views about what determines the reference of first-person thought. In the central 
part of the paper, section 4, I will refine the challenge from first-person thought, 
taking account of Morgan's effort to disarm the challenge to broadly epistemic views 
of reference determination, and showing its persistence for both acquaintance-based 
and broadly epistemic views. In section 5, I will consider François Recanati's answer 
to the Question of First-Person Aboutness, arguing that it falls on the second horn of 
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the dilemma articulated in the opening paragraph. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Extended Acquaintance Requirements on Being in Thought 
I will start by setting out the form of acquaintance requirement on a thing's being 
thought about that I favor. When it comes to thinking about something, or something's 
being thought about or in thought, we can make a broad distinction between a more 
and less substantial form of this relation. For instance, there seems to be a difference 
between thinking that there is a unique individual who is the oldest human 
currently living and thinking about Kane Tanaka, in particular. In the first case, one 
is, in some sense, thinking about Kane Tanaka, since she is (at the time of writing, 
and trusting Wikipedia) the oldest human currently living. But this seems quite 
different from thinking about Kane Tanaka because you are looking at her, or talking 
to her, or remembering her. In the latter cases, Kane Tanaka in particular seems to 
figure in your thought in a more substantial way than in the former. 
It is not easy to make this intuitive difference precise. Bertrand Russell used a 
notion of "acquaintance" to do so. He argued that for a thing to be in one's thought in 
the second, more substantial way, one had to be "acquainted" with it. On one 
ordinary understanding of "being acquainted" with something, there is something 
intuitive about this requirement, since one need not be acquainted (in that ordinary 
sense) with Kane Tanaka to think that there is a unique oldest currently living 
human, or to go on to think things about whoever satisfies that condition. But to 
think about her as a result of seeing her or remembering her, one would need to be 
(in the ordinary sense) acquainted with her. Russell, of course, was not using this 
ordinary notion, but understood acquaintance as such an unimpeachable epistemic 
relation that even those who see and talk to Kane Tanaka are not acquainted with 
her and can think about her only in the same insubstantial way as those who 
consider that there is a unique oldest currently living human (i.e., they can think of 
her only "by description").3  
Nonetheless, a tradition stemming from Russell retains the idea that a useful line 
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can be drawn between the more and less substantial ways for a thing to be in 
thought by appeal to a (less epistemically demanding) notion of acquaintance. A 
common denominator for this tradition, articulated by Robin Jeshion, is that the 
relevant kind of acquaintance must satisfy the following condition, which she calls 
the "Standard-Standard on Acquaintance": “One can be acquainted with an object O 
only by perception, memory, and communication chains.”4 To spell this out a little 
more, we can enumerate the kinds of events or episodes that can give a thinker 
acquaintance with an object, according to the Standard-Standard. These are: (i) 
instances of perceiving the object, (ii) instances of being referred to the object5 via a 
communication chain originating in someone's perception of the object and (iii) 
instances of remembering the object, where the memory derives either from one's 
past perceptions of the object or from one's past uptake of the object via being 
referred to it. I will call these S-acquaintance instances (the "S-" is to signify that they 
meet the Standard-Standard). 
In an earlier paper I distinguished two ways of using the Standard-Standard 
notion of acquaintance to articulate a requirement on having a thing in thought in 
the more substantial way just alluded to.6 These two ways differ with respect to 
how they spell out what this "more substantial" way of having a thing in thought 
amounts to. On the first kind of acquaintance requirement, the "more substantial" 
way is for the thing to figure in the content of one's thought, and acquaintance with 
the thing is required for this. On the second kind of acquaintance requirement, the 
"more substantial" way is for the thing to be in one's thought in a non-satisfactional 
way (i.e., for it to be in one's thought not in virtue of satisfying a condition that is also 
in thought), and acquaintance with the thing is required for this. 
A requirement of the second kind is: 
Non-satisfactional Acquaintance Requirement (NAR): 
 
3 Russell (1905 and 1910-11). 
4 Jeshion (2010: 109). The tradition endorsing an acquaintance requirement on the substantial 
way of having a thing in thought, and understanding acquaintance in accord with the 
Standard-Standard, has been called "the extended acquaintance tradition" (Dickie 2016) and "causal 
acquaintance" (Hawthorne and Manley 2012). 
5 By "being referred to the object," I mean roughly what Bach (2008) means by it: in 
understanding someone's use of a word to refer to an object, one is referred to that object.  
6 Pepp (forthcoming). 
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For a concrete object to be thought about in a non-satisfactional way, it must 
be thought about partly in virtue of one or more S-acquaintance instances.  
Note that this requirement is restricted to concrete (as opposed to abstract) 
objects. The restriction sets to one side the challenge that abstract objects cannot be 
perceived, so if they can be in thought in a non-satisfactional way, then the 
acquaintance requirement fails. This is a serious and interesting challenge to a 
general acquaintance requirement on being thought about in a non-satisfactional 
way. Addressing it requires taking up the broader question of how it is possible to 
think and know about abstract objects if they are causally inefficacious. This paper 
leaves that question for another time and focuses on whether an acquaintance 
requirement on being in thought non-satisfactionally is defensible even for concrete 
objects.   
Another thing to note about NAR is that it not only requires that S-acquaintance 
instances coincide with non-satisfactional thought about concrete objects, but that it 
is in virtue of these S-acquaintance instances that concrete objects are thought about 
in a non-satisfactional way.7 The idea behind NAR is that S-acquaintance is part of 
the mechanism of reference for thoughts that are non-satisfactionally about concrete 
objects. Part of what binds these thoughts to the objects they are about is the 
connection of these thoughts to thinkers' perceiving, being referred to, or 
remembering the objects. Of course, there are different views about what sort of 
connection is required so as to spell out the full mechanism. All that NAR requires is 
that S-acquaintance figures in that story. 
3. The challenge from first-person thought 
NAR is a plausible principle. Many of the kinds of examples that have been 
brought to bear against acquaintance requirements on "singular thought" are cases in 
which an object is clearly being thought about in virtue of satisfying a condition 
invoked in thought, and yet it is claimed to be intuitive that the content of the 
thought is singular with respect to that object—it is that object, not the condition that 
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brings it into thought, which figures in the content of the thought.8 Since these are 
clearly not cases of objects being thought about non-satisfactionally, they do not 
threaten NAR. Instead, NAR is threatened by cases in which it seems that a thought 
is about a concrete object both non-satisfactionally and not in virtue of 
S-acquaintance with the object. In the aforementioned paper I identified two such 
challenges: one based on cases, adduced by David Kaplan and Imogen Dickie, in 
which a thinker seems to think non-satisfactionally of an object in virtue of 
perceiving evidence of the object but not the object itself;9 the other based on 
first-person thought. My focus in this paper is the challenge to NAR from 
first-person thought. In particular, I aim to get clear on what the heart of the 
challenge is.  
3.1. The structure of the challenge to NAR 
The challenge to NAR from first-person thought is based on the following three 
claims:  
1. First-person thoughts are about concrete objects (i.e., human beings). 
2. First-person thoughts are not about particular human beings satisfactionally, 
i.e. in virtue of those human beings satisfying conditions that figure in the thoughts.  
3. First-person thoughts are not about particular human beings in virtue of the 
thinkers' S-acquaintance with those human beings. 
If all three of these claims are true, then first-person thoughts are 
counterexamples to NAR. By "first-person thoughts," I refer to the kind of thoughts 
we express in language using the grammatical first person. (This is not a definition, 
but only a way of pointing you to the thoughts in question.) Examples include my 
occurrent thought that I am tired or my standing belief that I was born in Boston.  
I am inclined to accept claims 1 and 2. Concerning 1, it is compelling that my 
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first-person thoughts are about the same thing that certain third-person thoughts on 
the part of other thinkers are about: namely me, a certain human being. Whatever I, 
this human being, ultimately am metaphysically speaking, I also find it compelling 
that this individual is just as perceptible as, say, tables and chairs, and hence is 
concrete enough for purposes of the present discussion. 
To reject 2, one might, in a Russellian vein, argue that first-person thoughts are 
about particular human beings in virtue of those human beings satisfying conditions 
that figure in a thinker's thought such as the condition of being the person experiencing 
this, where "this" anchors the condition in a particular mental episode (or other unit 
of mentation). I am not drawn to such an approach, for two reasons. First, it is not 
clear why thought about experiencing a mental particular would be prior to 
first-person thought. Indeed, it seems more likely that the idea or concept of 
someone's experiencing a mental particular would be derived from first-person 
thought about one's own experiences, at least ontogentically. Second, even if 
first-person thought is satisfactional in this way, the reduction relies on mental items 
being thought about non-satisfactionally. Thus, a defender of NAR will face the task 
of arguing that we are S-acquainted with our own mental episodes, which arguably 
would be a way of being S-acquainted with ourselves.10    
Claim 3, it seems to me, is the most promising of the three claims for a defender 
of NAR to reject. It is a (negative) partial answer to the Question of First-Person 
Aboutness. Thus, to reject Claim 3 would be to defend a broad positive answer to 
that question: namely, that first-person thoughts are about what they are about 
partly in virtue of being based upon a perceptual, memory, or communicative 
connection of the right sort to the object. "Connection of the right sort" is a 
placeholder: what counts as the right sort of connection could be specified in 
different ways. One approach would be to fill the placeholder with some sort of 
epistemic restriction, so that only connections that provide epistemic benefits (such 
as enabling the thinker to gain knowledge or true beliefs about the object) qualify.11 
 
9 See Kaplan (2012: 144) and Dickie (2016: chapter 6). 
10 Alternatively, in a Fregean vein, one might argue that first-person thoughts are about 
particular human beings in virtue of those human beings satisfying conditions imposed by private, 
primitive self-concepts that are present in thought. The problem here is that it is not at all clear what 
sort of conditions these would be. 
11 François Recanati (2012) calls such relations "epistemically rewarding." (I will return to 
Recanati's own answer to the Question of First-Person Aboutness in section 5 below).  
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A different approach would be to fill the placeholder with a less epistemically 
loaded restriction, perhaps requiring the connection to be information-carrying only 
in the sense that it allows the object to make some sort of cognitive impact on the 
thinker, whether or not this enables epistemic advance.12 Let us call this broad view 
of reference determination for thoughts—however "the right sort of connection" is 
ultimately spelled out—Aboutness through S-acquaintance. Another broad kind of 
view of reference determination for thoughts (which might overlap with Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance) is what I will call Aboutness through Epistemic Gain. On this 
kind of view, a thought is about what it is about partly in virtue of being based upon 
the thinker's ways of gaining knowledge (or justified true belief, or some other 
epistemically positive status) about that thing.  
Gareth Evans famously defended (albeit tentatively) a version of Aboutness 
through Epistemic Gain for first-person thoughts.13 But familiar problems for the 
view can make it seem hopeless.14 These problems stem from hypothetical cases 
designed to show that if Aboutness through Epistemic Gain were correct for 
first-person thoughts, then some first-person thoughts would fail to be about the 
person thinking them. But it is a truism that first-person thoughts are always about 
the person thinking them, so Aboutness through Epistemic Gain cannot be right 
when it comes to first-person thoughts. The hypothetical cases used to support this 
argument may be divided into two types, what I will call absences cases and diversion 
cases. They serve equally well as problems for Aboutness through S-acquaintance as 
they do for Aboutness through Epistemic Gain. Thus it is useful for someone like 
me, who is inclined to defend NAR, to consider the implications of this discussion 
for S-acquaintance-based views.  
Before I introduce the two types of case, it is worth a brief glance at the most 
prominent alternative to Aboutness through Epistemic Gain (or to Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance) for the case of first-person thought. I will call this 
alternative First-Person Aboutness by Reflexive Rule. This is the view that first-person 
thoughts are about what they are about in virtue of being governed by the rule that 
they refer to whoever thinks them. This view is not threatened by the kinds of cases I 
 
12 See Julie Wulfemeyer (2017) for development of such a view. 
13 In Chapter 7 of Varieties of Reference (1982).  
14 John Campbell (1994) and Lucy O'Brien (2007) lay out these problems.  
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am about to describe. But, as Morgan convincingly argues, nor does it provide a 
satisfying answer to the Question of First-Person Aboutness.15 This is because it is 
not clear in what sense first-person thoughts are governed by such a rule. If to say 
that they are governed by this rule is just to say that, in fact, first-person thoughts 
always refer to the one who thinks them, then the Reflexive Rule view describes the 
reference of first-person thoughts but is silent about what determines that 
reference—i.e., about in virtue of what first-person thoughts always refer to the one 
who thinks them. In other words, the Reflexive Rule view on this interpretation does 
not answer the Question of First-Person Aboutness at all. On the other hand, 
understood as an answer to this question, the Reflexive Rule view seems false. It 
might be accepted that rules (i.e., the conventions of language) make it the case that 
uses of the pronoun "I" refer to the one who uses the word, but no such conventional 
rules govern thoughts.16 Thus, if the cases I am about to describe tempt one to resort 
to Aboutness by Reflexive Rule, it should be held in mind that this is tantamount to 
giving up on answering the Question of First-Person Aboutness. This is the second 
horn of the dilemma of which the problems about to be raised are the first horn.       
3.2. Absence and diversion cases 
Now to the cases. First let us consider absence cases. Elizabeth Anscombe 
suggested the following scenario: 
And now imagine that I get into a state of ‘sensory deprivation’. Sight is cut off, and 
I am locally anaesthetized everywhere, perhaps floated in a tank of tepid water; I am 
unable to speak, or to touch any part of my body with any other. Now I tell myself ‘I 
won't let this happen again!’17 
As this is a "sensory deprivation" scenario, the subject is presumably not receiving 
information about herself either via external senses or via bodily senses (e.g. 
proprioception, kinaesthesia, nociception). It seems that having one's external senses 
cut off would also entail that one is not being referred linguistically to oneself via a 
communication chain originating in someone's perception of one. Evans added to 
 
15 See Morgan (2015: 1801-1802). 
16 Morgan also considers whether Peacocke's (2008) view should be seen as treating first-person 
thought as having its reference determined by a primitive rule of reflexive reference (as opposed to 
merely being correctly described as always referring to the thinker). He concludes that this is not 
clear, and that if the rule is treated by Peacocke as a primitive determiner of reference, it is not clear 
why we should accept this. 
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Anscombe's scenario the possibility that the person could also have amnesia and 
thus not be receiving any information about herself via memory.18 This seems to 
leave no instances of S-acquaintance for a first-person thought to be based on. 
Nonetheless, says Evans, the person in this scenario "may still be able to think about 
himself, wondering, for example, why he is not receiving information in the usual 
ways." If there is first-person thought about oneself in the absence of any 
S-acquaintance with oneself on which the thought could plausibly be based, this is a 
problem for Aboutness through S-acquaintance and for NAR. The case also seems 
like a problem for Aboutness through Epistemic Gain, since the subject's ways of 
gaining knowledge of herself are disabled. 
Next let us consider diversion cases. David Armstrong suggested the following 
scenario: 
We can conceive of being directly hooked-up, say by transmission of waves 
in some medium, to the body of another. In such a case we might become 
aware e.g. of the movements of another's limbs, in much the same sort of way 
that we become aware of the motion of our own limbs.19  
In this case, the subject is receiving information via proprioception—a likely kind of 
perception to determine the reference of first-person thoughts, given that it is a sense 
dedicated to perceiving the perceiver. But the information she receives is not about 
herself, but about someone else. If she then has the first-person thought, based on 
this information, that she is walking, and if the reference of this thought is 
determined partly by the perceptual connection on which it is based, it would seem 
that this first-person thought should be about the other person. Or, at least, there 
should be some uncertainty regarding whom it is about. But this seems wrong: the 
thought is about the person thinking it. This suggests that the thought's connection 
to the thinker's perception and memory, or to her ways of gaining knowledge, is not 
part of what makes the thought be about what it is about. This calls Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance, together with NAR, and Aboutness through Epistemic Gain 
into question.  
 
17 Anscombe (1981).  
18 Evans (1982: 215). 
19 Armstrong (1984: 113).  
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4. Refining the challenge from first-person thought 
Morgan mounts a strong defense of Aboutness through Epistemic Gain, arguing 
that absence cases are not as much of a problem as they appear to be, while 
diversion cases are harder to deal with but still leave various options open for 
defenders of Aboutness through Epistemic Gain. My own investigations in this 
section will suggest that the situation is reversed, both for Epistemic Gain theorists 
and for S-acquaintance theorists. Diversion cases can be handled, while absence 
cases, properly described, show the core of the problem posed by first-person 
thought for these  two kinds of view about reference determination.    
4.1. Absence cases 
I will begin with absence cases. It is notable that in presenting their scenarios of 
sensory and memory deprivation, both Anscombe and Evans describe the subject's 
first-person thought as a reaction to her situation. Anscombe's subject thinks (what 
she might express in language as) "I won't let this happen again." Evans's subject 
wonders "why he is not receiving information in the usual ways." Calling attention 
to the reaction that a subject would have to finding herself in a deprivation scenario 
makes it intuitive that someone in such a situation would, and a fortiori could, have 
first-person thoughts. But it should also lead us to question whether the cases 
described by Anscombe and Evans are really cases in which all perceptual, memory, 
and communicative connections of the right sort to determine the aboutness of 
first-person thoughts are absent. For if the first-person thoughts that a subject would 
have in these scenarios are reactions to her situation, then this suggests that she is 
somehow aware of, or receiving information about, how things are with herself.  
In this vein, Morgan suggests that the subjects in these scenarios remain able to 
introspect—to "rely on [their] direct way of gaining knowledge of [their] own mental 
properties."20 It is plausible that their first-person thoughts are based upon this way 
of gaining knowledge of themselves. For the purposes of defending Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance (and thereby defending NAR), one would have to argue that 
the kind of introspection on which these thoughts are based is plausibly perceptual, 
 
20 Morgan (2015: 1804). 
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or at least enough like perception that it does not violate the spirit of 
S-acquaintance.21 It seems to me that this condition will be met if the kind of 
introspection on which these thoughts are based is a means of detecting pre-existing 
mental states, properties or events.22 There is reason to suppose that the first-person 
thoughts we imagine people having in these scenarios would indeed be based upon 
the detection of a prior mental property or condition: the property or condition of 
not being perceptually aware in the usual ways and not having memories. 
Of course, these scenarios are not really so easy to imagine, and it is not entirely 
clear what we are supposed to imagine, especially concerning the subject's loss of 
memory. Are we to imagine her lacking all forms of memory—episodic memory, 
semantic memory, working memory, procedural memory and so on—or only some 
sub-class of these? I am not sure what the mental life of someone lacking all of these 
would or could be like, including whether or not they would or could have 
first-person thoughts (or any thoughts at all), especially when also deprived of all 
perceptual stimulus. But to make the best case against NAR, one might stipulate that 
the subject lacks all memory that counts as S-acquaintance with herself. (This would 
mean that her first-person thoughts could not satisfy NAR by their connection to 
memory instances of S-acquaintance with herself.) So, she might still remember 
things such as that Paris is the capital of France, or how to ride a bike. If so, then it 
might be suggested that she could have what Tyler Burge calls "cogito-like 
thoughts".23  These are thoughts in which one thinks a thought as part of the act of 
self-ascribing that thought. For example, the subject might think that she is thinking 
that Paris is the capital of France, where the thinking that Paris is the capital of 
France occurs as part of the thinking that she is thinking this. This would be a 
first-person thought, but it would seem to involve no detection of a prior mental 
condition of thinking that Paris is the capital of France.   
 
21 This is not critical for Morgan's purposes, since he is defending a version of Aboutness 
through Epistemic Gain: the view that the reference of first-person thoughts is determined by our 
"ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves." These ways of gaining knowledge need not be exhausted 
by instances of S-acquaintance. He notes that even if "it is wrong to think of introspection as a faculty 
that is just like vision, except that it is trained on the mind," introspection could still be appealed to as 
a way of gaining knowledge of ourselves. (2015: 1805) However, as we will see in the discussion 
below, it will not help Morgan's defense to appeal to forms of introspection that are radically 
dissimilar to S-acquaintance.    
22 Eric Schwitzgebel (2016) calls this the "detection condition" on introspection. 
23 Burge (1988). 
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Given the case as we have now described it, it strikes me as unclear whether the 
subject could have cogito-like thoughts. It is not so much that anything obviously 
prevents it. However, in considering what might prompt such thoughts in a subject 
with no perception of herself, including no detection of her own pre-existing mental 
states, and no memories of such perception or detection, it is difficult for me, at least, 
to have a firm intuition that such thoughts could come about in her. 
Nonetheless, it would be simple to modify the case further so as to remove this 
uncertainty. We can stipulate that not only does the subject lack all forms of 
S-acquaintance with herself, but she is also being artificially stimulated in such a 
way as to produce perceptual and introspective experience of the usual kind. In 
other words, we can make the case more like a Matrix or Cartesian evil genius 
scenario, although we specify that the subject is not even able to detect the mental 
states induced in her (anything she seems to detect in this way is fabricated). Let us 
call this an illusory absence case. A subject in such a situation presumably could have a 
cogito-like thought. This is a first-person thought. Intuitively, it is about the one who 
thinks it. But it cannot be about her in virtue of her S-acquaintance with herself, 
because she lacks any such S-acquaintance. 
Illusory absence cases seem to me to provide the core challenge to Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance and NAR. Do they challenge Aboutness through Epistemic 
Gain to the same extent? It might seem that Aboutness through Epistemic Gain is on 
better footing here, since it seems able to admit cogito-like thoughts as ways of 
gaining knowledge about oneself. If cogito-like thoughts are ways of gaining 
knowledge about oneself, then these thoughts can serve as determiners of the 
reference of first-person thoughts on an Epistemic Gain view. By contrast, the 
advocate of Aboutness through S-acquaintance cannot appeal to cogito-thoughts as 
determiners of reference, since they do not involve S-acquaintance.  
But it is questionable whether the epistemic view really has an advantage here. 
There is an air of circularity in the claim that a thinker's first-person thought is about 
herself in virtue of her being the person she can gain knowledge about by thinking a 
thought as part of self-ascribing that thought—that is, by thinking first-personally 
that she is thinking that thought. To treat cogito-like thoughts as a 
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reference-determining form of self-knowledge amounts to saying that a thinker's 
first-person thoughts are about her in virtue of its being her about whom she has 
first-person thoughts. So it seems to me that the defender of Aboutness through 
Epistemic Gain should be loath to appeal to cogito-like thoughts as a way of 
securing first-person reference in illusory absence scenarios. To do so is to follow the 
Reflexive Rule theorist in giving up on the effort to say in virtue of what first-person 
thoughts are about what they are about.  
In sum, absence cases as they are usually described are not definitive 
counterexamples either to NAR or to broadly epistemic views of first-person 
reference. However, when they are built up into illusory absence cases, it is difficult 
to resist the conclusion that first-person thought can occur and be about the one who 
thinks it without this aboutness being in virtue of either the thinker's S-acquaintance 
with herself or ways of gaining knowledge about herself. This, it seems to me, is the 
core problem for efforts to explain the aboutness of first-person thought in either 
way, and hence for NAR.  
4.2. Diversion cases 
As I mentioned above, Morgan thinks that diversion cases are more troublesome 
for Aboutness through Epistemic Gain than absence cases because, while absence 
cases can be dealt with by appeal to introspection, diversion cases require an 
explanation of why first-person thoughts are not about the sources of the 
information on which they are based.24 In the last section I argued that in fact 
absence cases cannot be effectively dealt with by appeal to introspection, neither by 
a defender of Aboutness through Epistemic Gain, nor by a defender of Aboutness 
through S-acquaintance. By contrast, I think diversion cases can be dealt with by 
rejecting the explanandum. That is, we do not have to explain why first-person 
thoughts in diversion cases are not about the sources of the information on which 
they are based, because it is not obvious that, in general, they are not about these 
sources. Instead, while it is highly intuitive that in such cases first-person thoughts 
are about the person thinking them, it is not uniformly so obvious that they are not 
also about the person from whom the information originates. 
 
24 Morgan (2015: 1806). 
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Let me first acknowledge that in a case like the one from Armstrong cited above, 
it seems pretty clear that in imagining the subject thinking that she is walking, or has 
crossed legs, we would (in Lucy O'Brien's words) "surely take it that I am thinking, 
probably falsely, about myself, rather than thinking truly about the person who was 
the source of the information."25 This intuition seems solid about this particular case, 
but I think variants on the case provoke less certainty, in particular about the claim 
that the thinker is not thinking truly about the person who was the source of the 
information. For instance, imagine a similar case of receiving proprioceptive 
information from someone else's body, but imagine this happening while one is 
doing a mindfulness exercise. One pays close attention to (what one takes to be) the 
position of one's body, carefully observing (what one takes to be) the angle of one's 
elbow, the tension in one's wrist muscles, and so on. One has various first-person 
thoughts as a result of this attentive study, thinking that one's elbow is bent exactly 
ninety degrees, that one's wrist muscles are just tense enough to support a press-up, 
and so on. One makes a concerted effort to get it right. It seems at least somewhat 
plausible that although the person in this case is clearly thinking falsely about 
herself, she is also thinking truly about the other person (that is, if her proprioceptive 
judgments are accurate with respect to their body).  
We might also consider a case in which the subject not only receives 
proprioceptive information from another person's body, but also nociceptive 
information, and quasi-memory of both types of perception from that other person. 
Imagine that on the basis of this information she has the first-person thought that the 
position she has (what she takes to be) her legs in now is more painful than the one 
they were in the last time she sat on a chair. Here, too, it seems plausible that in 
some sense she is thinking truly about the person who was the source of the 
information, even while also thinking falsely about herself. I suspect that the more 
information channels are diverted to the other person in an imaginary case, the 
stronger will be the sense that the thinker's first-person thoughts are in some sense 
about that other person, in addition to being about herself.  
These cases may be compared to cases involving linguistic reference that have 
 
25 O'Brien (2007: 39). 
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been called cases of "partial reference" or "multiple reference".26 In these cases, a 
speaker's confusion of two objects makes it plausible that she refers to both of them 
with her use of a name or demonstrative, and thus that she may say something true 
about one of them while simultaneously saying something false about the other. 
Michael Devitt illustrates the phenomenon using names: if I know Devitt has a cat 
called "Nana" and Devitt points out to me a Persian cat who is not Nana and says, 
"This is Nana," then if I later say, "Nana is a Persian," I am referring by "Nana" both 
to Nana, whom I heard about earlier from Devitt, and to the cat I was shown, who is 
not Nana. I am speaking truly of the latter, but falsely of the former. As Devitt puts 
it, "there is only one strong [basic intuition]: the 'total performance' involves 
elements of truth and falsity." 27  Susanna Siegel gives the following example 
(adapted from one used by Sydney Shoemaker in a different context):28 
You are a salesman in a tie store. By reaching past an opaque door into a display case, 
you put your hand on a blue silk tie. At the same time, another salesman is reaching 
through the cabinet and touching a red silk tie. Through the glass top of the cabinet, 
you can see the red tie being held by the other salesman, whose arm looks like yours. 
You mistake his hand for yours and you believe that you are the one touching the red 
tie. You say to a customer, who was looking in another direction for a red silk tie, 
"This one is red." 
Siegel points out that there are three things we might say about the use of the 
demonstrative 'this' in such a case: it refers to one of the ties but not the other, it fails 
to refer, or it refers to both ties. The advantage of the third option—the use of the 
demonstrative has multiple reference—is that it respects the intuition that the 
salesman says something true about the red tie, while also saying something false 
about the blue tie.    
If it is right that in some diversion cases first-person thoughts are  about the 
person the thinker receives information from in addition to being about the thinker, 
then such cases are not necessarily a problem for either Epistemic Gain or 
S-acquaintance views of the reference of first-person thoughts. For this is consonant 
with the claim that S-acquaintance, or ways of gaining knowledge, are partially 
determinative of that reference. Still, it might be objected that the diversion cases are 
 
26 The term "partial reference" comes from Hartry Field. (1973). It is developed for the case of 
singular terms by Michael Devitt (1981: 145ff). Susanna Siegel (2002) introduces the term "multiple 
reference" for the same phenomenon and applies it to demonstrative reference. 
27 (1981: 145) 
28 (2002: 10-11) 
 
17 
importantly different from Devitt's and Siegel's multiple/partial reference cases. In 
particular, the latter are cases about which it might be said that a single linguistic 
utterance is used to express two different thoughts. In Devitt's example, the speaker 
intends to say both that the cat she has been told about named "Nana" is a Persian 
and that the cat she was shown is a Persian. In Siegel's example, the speaker intends 
to say both that the tie he is touching is red and that the tie he is looking at is red. 
But in the diversion cases, what is at issue is not a linguistic expression that might be 
of two thoughts but a single, first-person thought. (Likewise, such single, 
first-person thoughts seem to be what are expressed using first-person linguistic 
expressions.) What, then, could factor such a thought into one instance of thinking 
falsely about oneself and one instance of thinking truly about someone else? 
One might appeal to the claim that these first-person thoughts are not based 
upon identifications to argue that no such factoring is available. Consider that the tie 
salesman's utterance of "This is red" arguably expresses a single, 
perceptual-demonstrative thought based on the speaker's overall perceptual 
awareness. Even if this is a single thought, it is based upon the thinker's 
identification of the tie he is seeing with the tie he is touching. This makes it 
plausible that the speaker is in some sense expressing two thoughts, one about each 
tie. By contrast, it is an often-noted feature of first-person judgments based on 
proprioception, nociception and the like that they are not based on identifications. In 
thinking that I am walking or have crossed knees, I do not think that the person 
whose body I proprioceive has crossed knees, identify that person as myself and 
thereby think that I have crossed knees.  
This seems right, but I wonder whether even thoughts like the one in Siegel's 
example are generally based on identifications. No doubt some of the time one 
consciously judges that something one is touching is the same thing that one is 
seeing, but much of the time our different sensory modalities seem to be integrated 
without any such conscious judging. As I type, fairly quickly, but not wholly by 
touch, I do not consciously judge that the keys I am hitting are the ones I am seeing, I 
just let my hand-eye coordination do its work. Suppose my coordination is off and in 
some instant the key I feel is not the one I (briefly) visually attend to. Having 
recently spilled cola on the keyboard, I think to myself that this key will be sticky. If 
the key I feel is in fact not sticky but the key I see is, it seems just as reasonable a 
 
18 
conclusion here as in the tie case that my thought is partly true—about the key I 
see—and partly false—about the key I feel. This does not seem to rely on my having 
made a judgment identifying the key I feel with the key I see. Maybe it is nonetheless 
right that I believe that the key I see is the one I feel under my index finger, even 
though I do not consciously judge this. But then it does not seem less right that I 
believe that the person whose body I proprioceive as having a hard but movable 
surface under its index finger is me. This is not a conscious identification judgment 
that I make, but I believe it, at least in the sense that if I were now told that I am in 
an Armstrong-style situation I would change my belief. This does not strike me as 
importantly different from the sense in which I believe that the key I am touching is 
the one I am visually attending to. 
Thus, I think we can allow that S-acquaintance with, and ways of gaining 
knowledge of, individuals other than oneself can be partly determinative of the 
reference of first-person thought.29 It is to be expected that intuitions will vary about 
in which cases first-person thought is partly, or additionally, about someone other 
than the thinker, while also being about the thinker. We find similar variations in 
intuitions about in which cases a speaker is referring (in language) to more than one 
object. But as long as it is plausible that such multiple or partial reference can occur 
in first-person thought, there is not a need for defenders of the S-acquaintance and 
Epistemic Gain views to explain away the (supposed) fact that it does not occur.  
4.3. Total diversion cases 
Appeal to multiple or partial reference is thus a viable way of defending NAR in 
the face of diversion cases. One type of diversion case it does not seem to help with, 
 
29 Morgan argues that in diversion cases the diverted senses are not ways of gaining knowledge 
of the other individual. A rough way of putting his suggestion is that for the subjects in diversion 
cases, faculties like proprioception may be supplying information from the other individual in the 
purely causal, non-epistemically beneficial way mentioned in section 3.1 above. But they are not 
enabling knowledge about the other individual because it is not their function to provide awareness 
of bodies other than one's own. (2015: 1806-1807) This is in the same way that vision, for example, 
does not function to provide awareness of the surfaces of our retinas, but of distal objects, even 
though in the purely causal sense our visual experiences give us information about the surfaces of our 
retinas. Thus, if a scientist artificially produced an image on one's retina, the resulting visual 
experience would not be a way for one to gain knowledge of the state of one's retina, even though it 
would carry information about this state. In effect, this suggestion assimilates diversion cases to 
absence cases, treating diverted senses in the same way as artificially stimulated ones. If this is the 
right thing to say on behalf of Aboutness through Epistemic Gain regarding diversion cases, then 
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however, are cases of total diversion, in which a subject has no S-acquaintance with 
herself because all of her usual ways of perceiving, remembering and detecting 
herself are diverted to another individual. 
Imagine Beth, an ordinary human being living an ordinary life. Now imagine 
Ann, another human being who is "hooked up" to Beth's body as in Armstrong's 
case, but more comprehensively. Not only does Ann receive proprioceptive 
information from Beth's body, she only receives such information from Beth's body. 
Moreover, Ann receives perceptual information only from Beth's body, seeing what 
Beth sees, hearing what Beth hears, tactilely perceiving what Beth touches, and so 
on. In addition, Ann quasi-remembers only Beth's memories. Finally, all of Ann's 
perception-like awareness of mental states and properties (i.e., detection forms of 
introspection) is detection of Beth's mental states and properties.30 This seems to be 
enough to establish that any S-acquaintance instances on which Ann's first-person 
thoughts could be based are instances of S-acquaintance with Beth. So if Ann could 
think first-person thoughts in this scenario, then if NAR is correct, those thoughts 
should be about Beth. 
This case is similar to an illusory absence case, except that Ann's perception and 
memory has its source in another individual, Beth, rather than in a fabrication. Just 
like in the illusory absence case, it seems that Ann could think first-person thoughts 
in this scenario. For Ann is not deprived of the kind of stimulus and information that 
might be needed to prompt first-person thought. However, it also seems that at least 
some of the first-person thoughts Ann would have in this scenario would not be 
about Beth. In particular, it seems that Ann could easily be prompted to think 
cogito-like thoughts, such as thinking that she is thinking that grass is green. These 
thoughts would intuitively be about Ann, not about Beth. (After all, the thought is 
intuitively true, but Beth, we may assume, is not thinking that grass is green.) But if 
they were about a particular thing partly in virtue of the thinker's S-acquaintance 
with that thing, then they could only be about Beth.  
 
again the core problem for the view is displayed by illusory absence cases.  
30 Here I follow Armstrong in taking it that it is "perfectly conceivable that we should have 
direct awareness of the mental states of others" (1993: 124), at least as long as that direct awareness is 
understood as detection-style introspection. (Armstrong suggests that in a case where one has such 
awareness of another's mental states we might call it 'telepathy' instead of 'introspection.')  
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One can imagine a philosopher of an enactivist or embodied cognition bent 
arguing that in such a case, the thinker of the cogito-like thought is not Ann, but the 
odd combined entity of Ann and Beth. Since Ann's cognitive and perceptual activity 
is so seamlessly and comprehensively integrated with Beth's, the thinker who is Ann 
is now Ann as augmented by Beth. So when this thinker thinks a cogito-like thought, 
the thought is about this augmented thinker. It may be about this augmented thinker 
in virtue of the augmented thinker having S-acquaintance with itself, since it has 
S-acquaintance with Beth who is a part of itself.  
But we can cut off such avenues by taking Beth out of the picture and turning 
this into an illusory absence case. In such a case there is no other individual who 
could be a part of the relevant thinker and with whom that thinker has 
S-acquaintance. So it seems the thoughts could not be about the thinker in virtue of 
S-acquaintance with the thinker. Hence the total diversion case either is a real 
problem for Aboutness through S-acquaintance and for NAR, or leads us back to the 
illusory absence case that is a real problem. For the same reasons as laid out above, it 
is also a problem for Aboutness through Epistemic Gain. But again, the problem 
stems from the thinker's lack of S-acquaintance with herself (or of ways of gaining 
knowledge of herself that could determine first-person aboutness). It does not stem 
from her having these links to others. 
5. Prospects for a Satisfying Reflexive Rule Account? 
At this point, it might seem inevitable that for first-person thought, Aboutness 
through Epistemic Gain and Aboutness through S-acquaintance should be rejected 
(the latter taking NAR down with it). This would leave us with Aboutness by 
Reflexive Rule, and the choice of either accepting that there is nothing more to say 
about in virtue of what first-person thoughts refer to what they do, or the task of 
developing a more substantive picture of what it is for a type of thought to be 
governed by a reference-determining reflexive rule.  
One such picture of the latter sort is offered by François Recanati.31 Recanati 
 
31 Recanati (2012 and 2014). Recanati describes his view as an epistemic view and as in 
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claims that first-person thoughts refer to what they do in virtue of involving a 
certain type of indexical mental file which he calls the "SELF file". Like all indexical 
files in Recanati's picture, a SELF file refers to a particular thing in virtue of the file's 
having the function of exploiting a certain epistemically rewarding ("ER") relation 
between the subject in whose mental architecture it appears and that thing. In the 
case of SELF files, this epistemically rewarding relation is identity. Identity is an 
epistemically rewarding relation for a thinker in virtue of making certain kinds of 
knowledge possible for her given her cognitive equipment. For those whose 
cognitive equipment includes faculties like proprioception, kinaesthesia and 
introspection, identity is epistemically rewarding and hence fit to be exploited by a 
mental file. Since SELF files refer to particular objects in virtue of having the function 
of exploiting the identity relation between subjects and those objects, and since the 
identity relation relates any subject to herself, it follows that whenever a SELF file is 
used (i.e., whenever anyone thinks a first-person thought), it refers to the thinker. 
This seems to me to be an attempt at giving substance to the view that 
first-person thought is governed by a reflexive reference-determining rule. Recanati 
says that the functions of mental indexical files like the SELF file play the same role 
for these files as conventional meanings play for linguistic indexicals, namely: 
"through their functional role, mental file types map to types of ER relations, just as, 
through their linguistic meaning (their character), indexical types map to types of 
conextual relation between token and referent." (2012: 60). So a SELF file, because its 
functional role is to exploit the identity relation for information, refers to the object 
identical to the subject. In this way, functional role provides a substantive notion of 
governance by a rule, doing for thoughts what conventional meanings are supposed 
to do for language. Recanati's picture adds substance to First-Person Aboutness by 
Reflexive Rule by taking the claim that first-person thought is about whatever the 
thinker bears the identity relation to and saying in virtue of what this is the case. The 
story is that it is the case in virtue of the identity relation being epistemically 
rewarding given the cognitive equipment of the thinker. 
Is this a satisfactory substantive notion of first-person thoughts being governed 
 
agreement with Evans and Morgan in taking an epistemic approach. But it seems to me that in fact 




by a reflexive rule? I do not think it is entirely satisfactory, for the following reason. 
In illusory absence and total diversion cases, faculties such as proprioception and 
kinaesthesia do not make the identity relation epistemically rewarding. These 
faculties do not enable Ann to gain knowledge of the person to whom she is 
identical; if they enable her to gain knowledge of anything, it is Beth. They do not 
enable the person in the enhanced Matrix scenario to gain knowledge of the person 
to whom she is identical. Of course, if one includes cogito-like thoughts as types of 
introspection, one can say that introspection still allows these subjects to gain 
knowledge about the people to whom they are identical. But again, that these 
thoughts are ways for these subjects to gain knowledge about themselves depends 
on these subjects' first-person thoughts being about themselves.  So this appeal to 
introspection cannot be used as part of a satisfying explanation of in virtue of what 
first-person thought is about what it is about.   
 In what sense, then, can a mental file possessed by thinkers in these situations 
function to exploit the epistemically rewarding relation of identity? Recanati might 
say that a thinker in an illusory absence situation deploys a malfunctioning token of 
the file-type SELF. The token would be malfunctioning because it fails to meet the 
"normative requirement corresponding to the function of the file," which is that "the 
subject should stand in a suitable ER relation to some entity (the referent of the file)." 
Nonetheless, the file-type might be tokened (and, presumably, refer to the individual 
to whom the thinker bears the identity relation) in the absence of such a relation so 
long as there is "a presumption that the normative requirements are (or will be) 
satisfied."32 The problem with this approach, it seems to me, is that there might not 
be a presumption that identity is an epistemically rewarding relation—for instance, 
the subject might be convinced that she is in an illusory absence scenario—yet 
cogito-like thoughts still seem thinkable.  
Perhaps a more promising reply is to emphasize the importance of the type of file 
of which individuals' SELF files are tokens. It is the function of this type of file to 
exploit the relation of identity, which is epistemically rewarding given the cognitive 
equipment of some relevant type of thinker in which this type of file occurs.33 As 
Recanati puts it, "Mental files are typed according to the type of ER relation they 
 
32 Recanati (2012: 63-64). 
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exploit." But here the question arises as to whether individual mental files are of the 
type SELF in virtue of exploiting the ER identity relation, or whether individual 
mental files exploit the ER identity relation in virtue of being of the type SELF. If the 
former, then it is not clear that subjects in the illusory absence cases have what could 
properly be considered tokens of the type SELF. This would imply that they do not 
think first-person thoughts, which seems to be false. If the latter, then the Question 
of First-Person Aboutness is going to be answered roughly as follows: a first-person 
thought refers to the one who thinks it in virtue of using a mental file of a type that 
exploits the ER relation of identity. But there is no longer anything to say about in 
virtue of what the first-person thought uses a mental file of that type. It is not in 
virtue of the thought's involving a file that exploits the identity relation, given that in 
illusory absence cases it seems subjects could not have such a file. So we seem to be 
stuck with the answer that a first-person thought is about the one who thinks it in 
virtue of being the type of thought that is about the one who thinks it.   
6. Conclusion: The crux of the problem 
Let us take stock. We saw that NAR requires that for first-person thought, the 
right account of reference determination must be based upon instances of 
S-acquaintance. But there are familiar problems for epistemic views of reference 
determination for first-person thought which seem to apply equally to 
S-acquaintance views. These problems might augur for rejection of such views (and 
NAR to boot), but as Morgan has argued, the alternative reflexive rule approach to 
the reference of first-person thought seems not to answer the question of reference 
determination at all. This provides motivation to try to overcome the familiar 
problems for epistemic views or S-acquaintance views. In digging in to these 
familiar problems, I have found that as they are usually presented, they are not such 
big problems after all. But variant presentations of them do reveal a serious problem: 
it is not clear how either epistemic or S-acquaintance accounts of the reference of 
first-person thoughts can allow for cogito-like thoughts to be about their thinkers in 
illusory absence cases. It is not helpful to point out that cogito-like thoughts are 
ways of gaining self-knowledge and can be included in an epistemic account of 
first-person reference determination. For what makes these mechanisms be ways of 
 
33 What might the relevant type of thinker be? Perhaps human beings? Or rational beings? 
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gaining knowledge about a particular individual is that the thinker's first-person 
thoughts are about that individual.  
So it seems to me that there is a real problem for both epistemic accounts of 
first-person reference determination and S-acquaintance based accounts. Thus, there 
is a real problem for NAR. However, there is also a real problem with dismissing 
these accounts: it seems to leave us with no account of what makes first-person 
thoughts be about what they are about. Maybe the problems for the alternative 
accounts are insuperable enough that we will in the end be driven to accept a kind of 
primitivism about the reference of first-person thoughts. This would in turn demand 
a basic, albeit limited, exception to NAR. I am not tempted by this option, but at 
present I am also not sure how to solve the problems for S-acquaintance and 
epistemic views of the reference of first-person thought. I hope that the above 
explorations have at least succeeded in properly carving out these challenges.      
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